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SOME IMPLICATIONS OF PLURALISTIC IDEALISLI
FOR THE AIMS OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.
Introduction
.
Philosophy is an attempt to view the universe
synoptically , to take all the facts into account and to re-
late them as coherently as is possible with human limita-
tions. No one thinker can compass all the facts of the
universe. The philosopher must build upon the results of
investigations in every field.
Special sciences are necessary and each must be
master of the facts in its own field. Yet every department
of knowledge is affected by all the other departments. No
science can expect to understand its own group of facts com-
pletely if it has no knowledge of other fields. To gain
this knowledge it must draw upon the conclusions of others
who are experts in their ov/n lines of investigation. All
practical sciences are concerned with the meaning of their
facts for life, and even the pure sciences find their ulti-
mate values in the same way. In other words every scientist
must know his own field; what other fields mean for his; and
what his field means for the rest of life. Philosophy aims
to relate these many fields into a coherent interpretation
of the universe as a whole.
11
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Religious education is one of the special sciences
and it is the purpose of this thesis to evaluate from the
standpoint of philosophy the aims which have "been adopted by
this science. The first step will be a brief summary of the
aims of religious education. The second step will be the
consideration of various world views in the attempt to ascer-
tain the most coherent interpretation of the universe as a
whole. The final problem will be the evaluation of religious
education in the light of the philosophy which we have adopted.
• i
•
I. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.
Religious education has been defined by Dr, Athearn
as the "motivation of conduct in terms of a religious ideal
of life". 1 Elsewhere he has defined Christian education as
"the introduction of control into experience in terms of the
ideals of Jesus Christ". 2 i n doing this religious education
is using the methods of general education but its goal is
more inclusive* In the words of Rorne, "Religious education
3is general education conscious of its true goal".
A. The Religious Education Movement.
Religious education is both as ancient as religion
and as recent as the last decade. Wherever there has been
religion there has been the constant necessity of teaching it
to the younger generation. The Ethiopian's demand for some-
one to explain the mysterious words of the prophet is but an
example of the need of every individual for a teacher. Ex-
perience is a great teacher, but experience needs guidance if
it is to be wide and varied. There has been a tendency to ac-
knowledge the importance of trained leadership in the field of
general education but to deny or minimize it in religious edu-
cation. This has arisen in part as a result of the view that
religious knowledge is revealed to every person in its perfect
and completed form. But is this true? A serious study of
the facts does not seem to point in this direction. Persons
1 National System pX Education , p. 30.
2 Lectures, 1924,
3 Encyclopedia of Sunday Schools, p. 900.
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have the capacity for religious development but they have to
learn the facts for themselves. It has been recognized in
practice even where it has not been recognized in theory, and
we have always had, in our homes and churches, training in mat-
ters of religion. There is, however, a great difference in
the kind of religious instruction given at different periods.
The teachings of Jesus included two fundamental prin-
ciples: knowledge of God and right relations to him; and right
social living. All his sermons and stories stress these two
ideas. He adopted the teaching method and worked persistent-
ly with a small group, endeavoring to instil these principles
past all forgetting.
But did the Christian church follow the example of
its founder in this? Not for very long. It soon made dog-
ma and doctrine the major part and grew away from the simple,
homely teachings of Jesus about God and fellowmen. Different
interpretations and accounts of Jesus were given and a bitter
struggle resulted in the formation of sects. Religious edu-
cation then became the teaching of the beliefs of one's own
sect and warnings against the heresies of others. We are
still suffering from the outcomes of this teaching.
The movement seems at present to be turning back again
to the experience of the individual with a new recognition
of his religious and social needs. Religious education of
the tv/entieth century is directed away from dogma and differ-
ences, and toward spiritual development and social unity. The
emphasis is not merely on religious knowledge, which tends to
it
t
5become barren int ellectuali sm, but on religious life which is
dynamic experience in all its richness and inclusiveness
,
based on knowledge but not completely exhausted by it.
The religious education movement is struggling
through the transition from the Sunday school to the church
school and the change is significant. The Sunday school
stood for a definite type of Biblical instruction under the
illusion that by knowledge are men saved. It has done a
splendid service in spite of the handicaps of its methods and
aim. Its teachers had a fairly thorough preparation of Bible
study but little or no training in methods of presenting the
truths thus gained to the child. As time went on leaders
began to realize that other needs of the children and young
people should be met. Devotional societies were formed to
provide an opportunity for religious self-expression; mis-
sionary societies to capture and train social impulses; and
finally clubs and organizations to meet recreational needs.
The result was naturally confusion, overwork of leaders, di-
vided loyalties, and unhealthy competition. No one can
serve four or five organizations successfully. Either he
will give half-hearted allegiance to all or he will choose
one and forget all the others.
The reaction was inevitable, A few far-sighted
people had the temerity to suggest that all these organiza-
tions be united into a church school which should provide a
four-fold program for the youth of the community. Under
this new program every activity would be centered around a
1
6single purpose and directed by the same corps of leaders. The
activities would complement rather than overlap.
The church school includes more than the imparting
of Biblical information. It is a school for training in re-
ligion and the Bible is the textbook par excellence , but
other material may also be used and must be included if relig-
ion is to be developed fully. The school of the church must
also train the leadership and membership of the church, even
as the school of the state trains leaders and citizens for
the state. For every need of the church there must be a cor-
responding department of training in the church school.
With such a program it is evident that the limited
time on Sunday for such instruction will not be sufficient.
It is the aim of religious educators to provide during the
week a school where all Protestant children may learn together
the common elements of religion and the principles and mater-
ials of worship. The Sunday period is conducted separately
by the various denominations and is supposed to be devoted to
worship and to instruction in the beliefs of that denomination,
This program has not as yet been put into practice very widely
tut it seems to offer great possibilities especially in wor-
ship which has been much neglected because of the stress on
instruction.
The public school is making steady progress, but it
is leaving entirely to the church the cultivation of the re-
ligious nature of the child. It teaches the sciences but can-
not go beyond empirical facts to meanings and fundamental val-
ues. It gives training in morals but it cannot give the
cf
highest motivation to moral conduct for this must come from
religion. If the spiritual life of the nation is to be built
up it is evident that the church must accept the responsibili-
ty. No other group can or ought to accept it.
B. The Aims of Religious Education.
If our purpose is to be accomplished it will be well
to make a preliminary statement of the aims of religious edu-
cation which it is our intention to evaluate from the philoso-
phical standpoint.
The ultimate aim of religious education must be de-
termined by the ultimate interpretation of religion. "Religion
is that type of personal life characterized by faith in and
the feeling of dependence on God, and dominated by the will to
cooperate with him in the conservation and increase of values."!
Certain assumptions are made by religious education on the
basis of such a definition: that there are persons; that they
are dependent on God; that he is interested in the production
of values; and that the highest duty of persons is cooperation
with him in the growing life of value. Religion is based on
the hypothesis that there is meaning in the universe, that
purposes are being realized. Accepting for the time being
such a view of religion, what will its aims be?
Two types of aims must be considered: 2 first, those
immediate aims which guide and determine the everyday process
of education; and second, those ultimate aims which are the
1 Brightman, Lectures, 1924.
2 The discussion of aims follows closely--Bett s , How to
Teach Religion .Ch. Ill; and Stout, Organization
.
Ch. III.

8standards or goals toward which the whole activity is direct-
ed and "by which it is tested. Stout suggests as an immediate
inclusive objective the aim "to secure a continuous recon-
struction of experience, with an increasing sense of spiritual
values, a growing consciousness of God and Christ in the life,
and an expanding disposition andability to recognize and dis-
charge one's obligation to God and to his ( sic l ) fellows." 1 The
ultimate aim is, "Christian life and character expressing it-
self adequately in one's relations to God and to his fellows."^
The immediate aims deal with the preparatory process-
es which are expected to fit the individual for the ultimate
goal. If we are to give training in religion it is certain
that we must commence with the elemental facts of religious
knowledge. These are the tools with which we shall later work.
If a child is to be religious he must know, so far as he can
understand, what religion is. This statement implies a grad-
ing of religious information to suit the needs and capacities
of the individual.
But knowledge unapplied is of little value to anyone.
To know what were good to do does not mean to do it. One of
the most serious problems of the educator is the application of
knowledge to conduct. It must, then, be the aim of religious
education to find means and methods whereby knowledge may be
put into practice in Christian living.
The method must be the creation of religious ideals
and the motivation of life in terms of these ideals. Such
1 Stout, Organization and Administration
, p. 50.
2 Ibid., p. 50.
<t
9motivation should involve the whole personality; intellect,
emotion and will, working in perfect harmony.
The ultimate aim of religious education is the achiev-
ing of character, the "building of personality. No religious
education is successful which does not lead to the development
of those sturdy Christian qualities which dominate and control
individual choices and actions. One of the fundamental pur-
poses of religious education is to "be present at every stage
in the development of the individual, giving at each step the
training and guidance necessary to assure right choices and
spiritual growth. Religious educators believe that those fac-
tors which lead to the need for evangelistic campaigns are un-
necessary and should he eliminated as soon as possible. The
ideal is constant and growing fellowship with God which will
lead without break or struggle to conscious commitment of each
life to his will.
Character cannot he built on any single value; it
must be inclusive, taking into account all the factors of hu-
man life and developing them harmoniously and in proportion.
If religious education is to teach the human race to live re-
ligiously it must involve at least a four-fold development.
The first essential in the building of character is
physical well-being. This includes both health and purity.
The latter is always recognized as necessary to religion but
the former is often ignored. Many have even disparaged health
and felt that feeble, wasted figures were a mark of extreme
devotion to the things of the spirit. Extreme they are in
(\
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truth, but unintelligent and destructive of some of the great-
est possibilities of religious service. Health is essential to
successful work. It is also a social responsibility, both be-
cause disease is contagious and because ill-health is a social
expense. Recreation is as much a part of physical development
as work. It also has social values for recreation unshared
soon loses its command on the interest.
Social cooperation is a keynote of the times. Science
has shown that no man can live to himself alone. All are
bound by countless ties to the social structure. Salvation is
becoming a social as well as an individual obligation. This
being the case it is necessary that people learn to live to-
gether religiously. The social sciences must become part of
the education of every person. The state recognizes and ful-
fills this need; but the social ideal must find its ultimate
justification in philosophy and religion. The conception of
universal brotherhood grows naturally out of the religious
teaching of the Fatherhood of God, and certain philosophies
reach the same conclusion.
In some quarters at present there seems to be a ten-
dency to underestimate the third factor in this scheme of
character building, mental development. It is admitted that
mere knowledge is practically useless. It is true that a man
may be good and yet ignorant; but it is also true that he
might be much better if he were more intelligent. It is the
duty of every person to seek mental development within the
limits of his capacity. It is the duty of society and of the
church to see that he has both opportunity and direction.
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In all of this we have not reached the heart of re-
ligious training which is spiritual insight. The roots and
springs of character must come from knowledge of God and in-
sight into his purpose for the world and for human beings.
Intelligent church membership, social service, and physical
culture are but by-products of the greater thing which is
spiritual vision and cooperation with the will of God. Char-
acter without this is one-sided, self-willed, lacking in dy-
namic and purpose. This does not mean that we should choose
that mystic contemplation which never comes back to the prob-
lems of real life; it rather involves what Hocking calls the
principle of alternation between the spiritual and the mun-
dane which links the actual and the ideal in a practical pro-
gram of socio-spiritual activity. If religious education
can achieve this aim it may rest assured that the other factor
will follow.
These, briefly stated, seem to be the chief aims of
religious education at the present time. Various schools
lay emphasis on different elements and some would deny one or
more of these. Many turn to details such as church union
and special methods. It has seemed better to consider the
more universal and permanent aims. It would be difficult to
reach any more detailed list on which all would agree.
Our aims are stated but there is still a question.
Much is assumed by these aims about the nature of God, human
personality and values. In a day when behaviorist and hu-
manist are receiving so much support are we right in laying
11
t
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emphasis on \ ersonal development and a purposive universe? The
results of the sciences seem to point toward the dependence of
mind, whatever it may be, on body. We cannot deny the close
relationship and our new knowledge of the body is helping us
to a better understanding of some mental processes. We are
able to predict more accurately in the mental realm and we may
well wonder whether determinism is not true even here. Should
we not then be aiming at the development of biological organ-
isms in a mechanistic world? We must also ask whether relig-
ion is merely social. Social values and social obligations
are compelling and universal. Is religion the social passion
or is there some objective reality which assures the validity
of our social ideals? These and similar questions can be
answered only with the aid of philosophy. We must ask the
question: What is the nature and meaning of the universe?
Our answer will determine the validity of the aims of relig-
ious education.
f
II. THE NATURE OF ULTIMATE REALITY.
Metaphysics is the logical "basis of all constructive
thinking about religious questions. It seeks to discover
what is the ultimate reality underlying the world which we ex-
perience. It would know whether reason and law are inherent
in the ground of things, or whether irrationality and chaos
are the whence and whither of life. The meaning and value
of the results of all thinking can be found satisfactorily
only in an interpretation of ultimate reality. Our thinking
on matters of religion must be submitted to the same tests as
our other thinking. Religious education which is based on
ultimate unreality cannot stand the test of time and use.
This then is the question we would face: Is reality reasonable,
and like mind, or is it something chaotic and incoherent? In
other words, does philosophy make faith in God possible or im-
possible?
A. Kinds of Ultimate Reality.
Descartes, the first of the modern philosophers, set
the problem in its present day form when he asked how many
kinds of reality there are ultimately. There are three pos-
sible answers: monism, dualism, or pluralism. The monist
would hold that there in ultimately only one kind of substance
or being and that all we experience as different may finally
be reduced to this one. Here we may classify most material-
ists and idealists. The dualist interprets reality as
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fundamentally of two types, mind and matter, a sort of union of
the two systems, idealism and materialism. Descartes subscrib-
ed to this view and a similar position is held by critical
realists such as Pratt, and neo-scholastics like !Iercier. Plu-
ralism is the view that there are many irreducible kinds of ul-
timate reality. Modern neo-realists and pragmatists are def-
initely pluralistic.
B. A Critical Estimate of Monism.
Confronted by these conflicting views we may well ask
what can be said in defense of each. Arguments for and against
monism will bring out the truth and falsity of the other posi-
tions. What are the chief objections to viewing reality as ul-
timately one?
1. The Realistic Objection.
It is, in the first place, in opposition to our every-
day interpretation of experience. It is not at all pleasing to
the "man on the street" to hear that all the things which he
sees as distinct and different are ultimately oi one kind. But
we cannot accept this view of the naive realist without attempt-
ing to examine it and see if it is the best solution.
There certainly is much of truth in this view. If
we are to base our investigations on what we find in experience
(and where else can we start?) then we must admit that there
seem to be a least two very different kinds of stuff in the
universe. There is matter which seems to be a closed system,
1«
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in which definite prediction is possible. It exists in a
space-time world and operates according to mechanical laws.
On the other hand there is mind which seems to be not mater-
ial, not in space or time, not bound by mechanical laws, not
predictable. Science deals with the whole material world as
a common body of facts which are objectively observaole. It
also studies consciousness and its lav/s. The results of such
study raise the problem how such different things can exist in
the same world, and even more, how they can affect each other
as experience seems to proclaim that they do.
Scientific analysis goes much further than the simple
experiences of the naive realist and reveals matter, not as
solid and substantial, but as made up ultimately of electrons
in motion. The laws which govern electrons seem to be mechan-
ical and determined. Science in general has accepted this
conclusion though some scientists are beginning to question it.
It is much easier to formulate laws and predict the future in
awch a universe. Schiller raises the question whether this
1
convenient mechanism is true even of the inorganic world. The
law of averages seems to allow for relative freedom in the or-
ganic world without destroying its predictability. Why might
this not be even more possible in dealing with such minute par-
ticles as atoms and electrons? Our instruments are so crude
that error cannot be avoided. "It is entirely possible that
the world may now be, and may always have been, such as to con-
tain a certain indetermi nation throughout its structure, which
we have only failed to discover because we have closed our
1 Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p.412ff.
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eyes to it, in order to have a more easily calculable universe.
Be that as it may, there remains the question of the relation
between consciousness and the world of nature.
How can two such unlike factors as mind and matter
work together in harmony? There must be some connection and
yet they are entirely different in kind and in mode of expres-
sion. If the mechanical interpretation is final there can be
no room for freedom; and even relative indet ermi ni sm does not
account for interaction. Without it the tv/o must remain for-
ever separate and operate much as the Leibnizian monads in
their preftstablished harmony.
Reason, however, proclaims that when tv/o things work
together in parallel systems and in perfect harmony we should
at least ask ourselves whether there may not be some connec-
tion between them. The uncritical man may say: Accept the
two and admit interaction. The scientist and the logician
join in stern rebuke. The former says that conservation of
energy and mechanical law would be destroyed. The latter
protests that it is illogical to say that absolutely separate
things can affect each other. Granting this, we may adopt
the materialistic solution and say with Hobbes that mind is
only a refined form of motion.
2. Materialistic Monism.
Materialism is a monistic system. The inherent dif-
ficulty in dualistic systems has been well stated by Miss Cal-
kins who says: "Granted that reality is of two fundamentally
1 Ibid
., p. 417.
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unrelated kinds, spiritual and material, how does it happen
that an individual of the one sort has an influence on an indi^
vidual of the other? Why do material things affect mind so as
to produce sensations, and why does mind induce voluntary move-
ments in a body, if-as Descartes t eaches -material substance is
independent of any spiritual substance save only God? Must we
not even ask how God, a spiritual substance, can create or in-
fluence material things, if spirits and material realities are
totally unrelated? The difficulty thus involved in asserting
on the one hand the unrelatedness , on the other the necessary
relation, of minds and bodies, is the problem met by the sys-
tems of qualitative monism."*1 Materialism offers a system
made up of one kind of being and governed by laws which can af-
fect all parts of it. The mind demands unity but is the unity
offered by this system sufficient?
To view all our experience as a mad race of particles
through space is as unreasonable as to hold that it has nothing
to do with matter and motion. The materialist explains mind
wholly in terms of matter. He says that it is a form of body
or that it is entirely due to physical things. This is far
from being an explanation of consciousness. The laws of mat-
ter in motion certainly are not the same sort of laws that we
find governing conscious experience. "Consciousness fills no
space and cannot move in space, although it affects and is af-
fected by "matter"; there is nothing in matter or its proper-
ties that can express what we mean by reason or purpose, choice
or hope, value or self-experience. Naturalism, then, rests
1 Calkins, Persistent Problems of Philosophy
, p. 56.
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on selected facts; it is an attempt to explain the whole of ex-
perience, including mind, in terms of a part, namely, a certain
class of the objects of experience." 1 It omits facts which
are necessary to an adequate conclusion.
3. Idealistic Monism.
The idealistic solution begins at a different point,
or rather it defines its point of beginning more clearly. The
materialist starts with the entire external world as he exper-
iences it. The idealist starts with his own experience since
he recognizes that this is all he can ever know immediately. I
knew my ideas about objects and other selves but I can never
possibly get any knowledge of another self which is not my idea.
This reasoning may lead to the view of solipsism, that nothing
is metaphysically real which is beyond me. Solipsism is a
denial that my ideas refer to an external reality, or at least
that it is possible to give any account of reality. Such a
conclusion v/ould mean the giving up of the game of thought al-
most at the beginning but there seem to be facta which make
such an abandonment unnecessary. It is perfectly true that
all I know must be known through my ideas but this does not
mean that I have to create those ideas. Any reasonable mind
recognizes the difference between imagination and ordinary ex-
perience that refers to objects and other selves which are pres-
ent to our senses. The former we find to be within our con-
trol; the latter is far from being so. Starting from what we
know of ourselves, how can these experiences best be inter-
1 Brightman, Introduction t o Phi losophy . p. 234.
t « t ID •$
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preted? Not by saying that they are unreal, but by making syn
optic hypotheses as to the type of reality they reveal and test
ing out these hypotheses, examining their inner coherence and
their coherence with the rest of experience. If part of our
experience is not subject to our wills, if we do not feel our-
selves to be the creators of it, the most natural hypothesis
would be that it is something other than our imagination but
capable of being experienced by us. If in our experience we
meet other selves we may assume that they are like us, but we
must go beyond mere assumption and analyze each experience into
its simplest elements to discover whether it is really like our
own. But analysis is only half the story. "We must reconstruc
the whole and see it in relation to other wholes. Only through
the synoptic vision can we determine whether our hypothesis
leads to a coherent interpretation of experience. Such a
method reveals, not that I am all that there is, but rather
that all that there is is of the same sort of stuff, experience
stuff, and selves who experience it; not that my little solip-
sistic orb embraces all that there is, but that the whole uni-
verse is patterned after the truth so vaguely and imperfectly
revealed in me. This certainly is a more coherent and a more
fruitful hypothesis than that of solipsism.
The view at which we are arriving is monistic but
qualitatively mental rather than material. It maintains not
only the reality of consciousness but also the ideality of phy-
sical things. This is based on the Berkeleyan contention that
all we know of an object is expressible in mental terms. Both
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primary and secondary qualities have meaning only for minds,
and what right have we to assert that anything which has no
meaning, about which we can assert nothing, exists?
.Not only this, but nothing can "be known to exist apart
from some mind. we can have no experience of anything except
sensations and ideas. Material things as solid and substan-
tial are absolutely unknowable. We must find a way in which
these things, admittedly ideal in nature, can be interpreted
coherently. How do they happen to exist at all? Why do most
minds experience them in about the same way? A single individ-
ual may experience a part of the universe and it becomes real
for him as part of his experience but how is it to be inter-
preted coherently when he is not experiencing it? Certainly
there is no guarantee of uniformity in the world of nature if
each individual must create it for himself. Things can exist
only for persons and yet they seem to have a permanence and
stability which finite selves could not give them. According
to Berkeley things exist only as they are known, and yet it is
impossible to build up a coherent world merely on the percep-
tions of finite individuals. Materialism, with its laws of
matter in motion, has given a partial account of things but has
failed to explain mind. Yet the universe seems to be mind-wise
not motion-mad. Berkeley meets the difficulty in the state-
ment that God exists as the cause of our ideas and as their per
ceiver when we are not perceiving them. The whole realm of
nature is his continuous experience and the problem of material
i3m is thus solved by turning it into idealism. The physical
world can be understood and experienced by minds because it is
f
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itself the experience of a Supreme Mind, If Berkeley's argument
"be true then we must cease to contend for things which are ut-
terly other than consciousness.
A study of the nature of personality gives another
clue^to the meaning and unity of the universe. I , as a limited
self, could not possibly reach out beyond myself to a world of
other selves and physical things if solipsism were the truth.
I could not communicate with other selves, nor could I know any-
thing which was not my own creation. But my experience tells
me that I do communicate with other persons; that I can both
use and understand physical things; and that I can know a world
of ideals and possibilities which I only partially attain. How
is this possible? Rashdall develops the idea that it is irra-
tional to suppose minds and bodies which work together with a
fair degree of harmony to be of utterly different origin and in-
dependent.! Here we have the reverse of the previous argument
that interaction of unlikes is unreasonable. We seem to exper-
ience ourselves as unique, independent individuals and yet how
does it happen that we inhabit bodies and get along fairly well
with a material world which we have found to be the experience
of God? It seems reasonable to come to the same conclusion
which we reached in regard to things, namely, that we also are
dependent on God for our existence. This preserves a unified
view of the universe as a great whole. God is that whole and
persons and things are parts of his experience. Just what this
dependence means and how far it is to go we have still to dis-
cover, and on the discovery must rest our interpretation of God.
1 Rashdall, "Personality: Human and Divine." in Sturt.Personal Idealism , p. 381.
^ouuxu,
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The trend of thought is away from a piecemeal view of
the world and toward a union of the many part 6 into a meaning-
ful whole. Organic logic rather than analytic gives the most
coherent interpretation of experience. The mind acts as a
whole and the various parts of its experience have significance
only as they are related to the rest of experience. True, we
can analyze our experiences much as we analyze our dreams, and
find the source of the various parts, hut the meaning is not
clear until it is related to the experiencer as a living whole.
The mere fact that I perceive a green book may mean much or
nothing. If it is an unfamiliar book it is certainly an in-
significant part of my experience. If on the other hand it is
a book whose pages are alive with thoughts that I have mastered
and made my own then it is a vital part. Gentile says^- that
the author lives in the mind of the reader and that there is in
a book only what the reader gets out of it. It is interpreted
by each in the light of all that he has previously built into
himself. Tennyson's Ulysses says: "I am a part of all that I
have met." But even more truly, all that I have met is part of
me. I am the synthesizer that unites the many fragments of ex-
perience into a worthful whole. The fragments have no impor-
tance till they are related and interpreted. Gentile is right.
But whither is this leading us? Is the whole the only
true reality? It would seem to be so if our process of reason-
ing thus far is correct. We have found that physical things are
meaningless apart from minds, and that they find their meaning
only when related to each other in the unified experience of
1 Gentile .The Reform of Education.
r
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the Sppreme Mind, We have at least raised the question whether
the same may not be true of persons. This problem we shall
now consider.
C. Absolute Idealism.
Absolute idealism develops the view that finite selves
find their meaning only in relation to a Supreme Mind. They
are true parts of the experience of the Absolute and have no
existence or meaning apart from it.
1, The Values of Unity.
The fundamental thought of this system is the unity of
all experience in the Absolute. The finite self, the absolu-
tist says, is full of limitations, yet it is the only key we
have to what really is; therefore we must search out its impli-
cations. Here we go beyond the realm of naive experience to
that of coherent thought. How can we give the most reasonable
account of all our experience? Certainly coherence must be a
mind-like quality and if our finite minds point to an ideal of
perfect coherence, is it not rational to suppose that ultimate
reality must realize this ideal and be perfect coherence? If
it is perfect it must transcend all the failures and errors to
which we are subject. If only the whole is real then the
parts must derive their entire meaning from their relation to
the whole. Persons, as well as things, are parts of the Abso-
lute, dependent upon it for their existence and value.
This certainly offers a unified system and an organic
logic, but is it true to all the facts? The only facts we have
<i
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are those of experience. Can they be fully interpreted in
terms of an Absolute? There are very serious difficulties in
such a view.
2, Problems which Remain.
In the first place I do not experience myself as being
a part of any other self. Experience is private and it is con-
trary to the whole idea of personality that anyone else should
ever have my experience as I experience it. The absolutist says
that all I experience is part of the Absolute's experience. But
the problems of ignorance and error arise. How can the Abso-
lute include either of these genuine parts of my experience?
He can know about my error, but he who knows the truth cannot
possibly have the baffling experience of partial knowledge v/hich
is mine. The absolutist says that these are included but tran-
scended by the Absolute and that, without him, there could be
no truth or error. This is one escape, but it is an escape
by denial rather than by explanation.
Absolutism must account for finite selves with their
error and partiality and yet their experience of individuality.
As a part of the Absolute I can have no meaning in myself, no
initiative, no self-direction; and yet these are all character-
istics which my experience leads me to think I do possess.
Schiller humorously suggests a possible escape for absolutism
from the standpoint of abnormal psychology. A catastrophe or
a period of morbid reflection may result in the breaking up of
a normal mind into one or more divided personalities all in-
habiting the same body but existing as absolutely private
(r
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thought lives or communicating much as one person does to an-
other. The famous case of 'Miss Beauchamp 1 is an instance in
point. Such a theory, carried over into absolutism would, hold
that finite persons are the result of the dissociation of the
Absolute. "On this theory all existences would be secondary
personalities of the one Absolute, differing infinitely in
their contents, character, and capacity, and capable of co-ex-
istence and concurrent manifestation to a much greater extent
than were the members of the 'Beauchamp 1 family, in which this
power v/as possessed only by Sally. "^ 'Miss Beauchamp' reachiev-
ed unity through the aid of Dr. Prince but, Schiller points out
there would be no such possibility for the Absolute since there
is nothing outside it to perform the cure. It must forever say:
"I have too many selves to know the one." The novelty of this
solution is recognized by Schiller and he says: "It is a little
startling, e.g., at first to have to think of the Absolute as
morbidly dissociated or even as downright mad." but, as he hu-
morously adds, "If the Absolute is to include the whole of a
world which cont&ins madness, it is clear that, anyhow, it must,
in a sense be mad." 2 The theory is ingenious but why inter-
pret the universe in terms of what is recognized as abnormal and
exceptional? Certainly, as Schiller shows, this should be ac-
cepted only after all other solutions have failed.
Other problems are raised by the view that my exper-
ience is the experience of the Absolute. In such a case my
consciousness is absolutely determined by the will of the Abso-
lute. There is always the feeling that the individual may
1 Schiller, Studies in Humanism , p. 270.
2 Ibid., p. 273.
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choose between alternatives, but such a feeling must be an il-
lusion. Mechanical necessity rather than choice and initiative
must be the verdict.
The problem of evil is ever present. The absolutist
may solve it in either of two ways. He may say that there is
no evil. What seems so is mere error of mortal mind, due to
our limited perspective. The Absolute includes the universe
within himself. He is perfect and it, as part of him, must al-
so be perfect. Finite beings have no real freedom for how
can the part act independently of the whole? Evil, true though
it may seem to us, is in reality only an illusion. God, who
sees a whole life, knows that an act which is wrong for the in-
dividual will make his later life better because of the strength
which it takes to conquer that one sin. This may be true in
some instances but are we to say: Sin in order that you may have
something to conquer? Again, God who sees life in its larger
terms may know that one man's sinful life will lead to good in
the lives of others. Is that life to be called good because of
its results? Most certainly not! Evil must remain evil no mat-
ter what its final outcome may be. This view approaches the at-
titude of the mystic, and says that if you can lose yourself in
the Infinite, evil and pain will be transformed into something
beautiful and good.
The other vie. is that evil is essential to the per-
fection of the whole. It says that finite individuals must suf-
fer and sin in ways that they do not understand in order that
the Absolute may reach perfection in himself. Royce develops
this view that God needs struggle in order to be a moral being.
1
1 Studi es in Good and Evil, pp. 1-28.
1X I
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In my sin and suffering God suffers also and my sin is partial
defeat for him though only temporary. To think that God is
suffering with me and with all other human "beings may be a com-
fort to me. His suffering must "be far greater than mine; quan-
titatively, because he has to suffer with all humanity, and,
qualitatively, because he sees so much deeper into the meaning
of life and its possibilities. But it seems to me that this
view is not consistent with the fundamental principles of abso-
lutism. If God is all that there is and perfect wherein is the
necessity of all this suffering and sin?
What about finite beings in a universe so completely
determined? Moral conduct is possible only for free beings. If
man is a completely determined part of the whole, of course free-
dom is impossible. Some absolutists deny the possibility of
freedom; others, like Miss Calkins, admit it and try to prove its
possibility on the basis of statistical as opposed to rigid math-
ematical law."'" The attempt is dangerous to absolutism and
scarcely convincing.
Absolute idealism gives unity and system to our thought
and includes the truths of idealism. It is, however, an unsat-
isfactory account of personality for it denies the unity and pri-
vacy of finite consciousness. It makes freedom impossible and
solves the problem of evil by denying it or making it necessary
to the character of the Absolute. Recognizing all these diffi-
culties can we say that absolute idealism offers the most co-
herent view of the world that is possible? It certainly is
truer than the dualistic systems and materialism, but is there
not a better solution?
1 Persistent Problems of Philosophy , p. 474.
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D. Pluralistic Idealism.
To many minds the solution given by pluralistic ideal-
ism is more satisfactory than that of monistic idealism. By
pluralistic idealism we mean that view which holds that there
are many relatively independent selves, and that there is noth-
ing in the universe except these selves and their experience.
The view is qualitatively idealistic but numerically pluralis-
tic. There are three distinct types of pluralistic idealism:
the Atheistic pluralism of LTcTaggart ; the ethical individualism
of Howison; and the theistic pluralism of Lotze,Ladd, ward and
Bowne.
1. Atheistic Pluralism.
The argument for pluralism is taken up by McTaggart at
the point where absolute idealism leaves it, McTaggart is an
interpreter of Hegel and in close sympathy with him though he
finds the logic of Hegel pointing to numerical pluralism rather
than monism. The pluralism of McTaggart avoids many of the dif-
ficulties of Hegelian monism.
McTaggart holds that the universe is ultimately spirit-
ual in nature and that it is made up of many separate and dis-
tinct individuals. This f community of selves' makes up the
whole of reality. The Absolute is all-inclusive and there is
nothing which can exist outside of it. But the Absolute is not
to be thought of as personal for this involves essential con-
tradictions, as we have seen in our previous discussion. .Not
only are the problems of privacy and ignorance unsolved, but
6.
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McTaggart points out new difficulties. Self is an indivisible
unity of consciousness but the Absolute cannot be such a unity
for it is divisible into innumerable persons. "If the Absolute
had a consciousness of self, that consciousness could not fall
outside the finite persons. For then those persons would not
fully manifest the Absolute. And the self-consciousness of
the Absolute, again, cannot be in each differentiation separate-
ly, for then it would be identical with the self-consciousness
of each finite person, and the Absolute, as a unity, would have
no self-consciousness at all. But the only remaining alterna-
tive is that the self-consciousness of the Absolute is the unity
of its differentiations." 1 McTaggart rightly admits that there
is no meaning to self-consciousness which has reality only in
relation to its parts and which is nothing apart from them.
Some have objected to this on the ground that it is of
the character of selfhood to bring together the varied parts of
experience into an essential unity, and that the Absolute is
such a unity, since it is a 'spiritual unity' of the many finite
persons. McTaggart shows that this objection carried out to its
logical implications would involve the necessity of calling
every spiritual unity, from clubs to football teams, a person.
2
This leads to confusion rather than clarity in the use of the
term 'person'
.
It is evident, according to McTaggart, that the Abso-
lute, though a spiritual unity, is not personal. A further dif-
ficulty arises from speaking of the Absolute as God. The term
1 Studies in Hegelian Cosmology
, p. 85.
2 ibxd. » P. Q6 »
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'God' in common parlance has a personal meaning. Confusion
must follow any ar tempt to identify the Absolute with God if
reality as a whole is, as he says, impersonal.^"
The Absolute is, then, a community of interdependent
selves.' These selves have significance only in their relation
to the whole, but the relation is reciprocal for the whole has
meaning only v/hen related to the individuals of which it is com-
posed. The whole is merely the sum of its parts and would have
no meaning, no existence, alone. The interaction of the parts
is essential in order that selves may define themselves. The
problem of knowledge, according to McTaggart, leads to this con-
clusion. In order for the self to know itself there must be
some object beyond it from which to distinguish itself. The
fact of objective reference is fundamental. All experience
which I have is my own experience yet I recognize that large
parts of it refer to objects which are external to me. Like
the monads of Leibniz, persons are centers of cognition for
themselves but they also- mirror the universe, though, unlike
the monads, they are in relations with each other. When the
cognition of the individual is perfect "his whole nature
would consist in the conscious repreduction of the system of
which he is a part," 2 "God is a community, and every man is
part of it. In a perfect unity, such as God is, the parts are
not subordinate to the whole. The whole is in every part, and
every part is essential to the whole. Every man is thus a per-
fect manifestation of God. He would not be such a manifestation
of God, indeed, if he were taken in isolation, but, being taken
1 Ibid., p. 56ff.
2 Ibid
. . p. 14.
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in the community, he embodies God perfectly." But is McTag-
gart right in saying that any part, even in social relations,
could ever be a perfect representation of the whole? If the
powers of cognition were perfect he might know the whole but
he could not represent it in himself.
The problem of the origin of the many selves is not
clearly answered by McTaggart, but the suggestion above that
"every part is essential to the whole" points to the view of
universal immortality which he adopts. The whole cannot remain
perfect if parts are constantly being dropped out for no other
individual can take the place of the one lost.
Any view of a personal God is, for McTaggart, incom-
patible with the community of selves or with the Absolute as
sum of selves. All types of pluralistic idealism agree with
McTaggart in the conclusion that God is not the community of
selves or the Absolute as all that there is. They do not, how-
ever, find this a ground for the atheistic conclusion as does
McTaggart. Their reasons for this difference will be consider-
ed later.
Be this as it may, there is still the problem of the
character of the universe. Ars goodness and reality synony-
mous or is reality indifferent or bad? McTaggart follows Hegel
in the conclusion that the supreme good and the supreme reality
are one, and that the supreme goal of conduct is the complete
realization of the absolute good.^ The duty to realize the
good would not, he holds, be lessened by the conclusion that
there is no God. Virtue would be just as binding, right and
c<
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wrong just as clear. As Dr Brightman has put it: "Whether we
"believe in God or not, there is value and there is obligation.
Whether God issues moral commandments or not, obligation is
self-recognized and self-imposed.""1' McTaggart admits the
changes which would probably be made in morality by atheism
but endeavors to show that recognition of the responsibilities
of membership in the community will take the place of divine
sanctions in controlling conduct. There are other thinkers,
however, who find the fact of moral obligation pointing direct-
ly to the existence of a personal God. Sorley presents this
p
argument with great force. Just as our sense-perceptions
point to an objective physical world, so do our moral percep-
tions point to an objective moral order. Obligation can exist
only in minds and it is reasonable to suppose that an objective
moral order can exist only in a Supreme Mind. Such an argument
is at least a partial refutation of McTaggart 's atheism.
Even though the universe be good there still remains
the question of the kind of goodness. Is it static or progres-
sive? Is there a real directive agency in the universe, pur-
posive, pointing toward ends? McTaggart seems to feel that
there is some sort of purpose in reality which the many are try-
ing to realize and yet how can there be teleology on a univer-
sal scale if there is no Supreme Mind? The many may combine
efforts for the accomplishment of particular ends but no world
purpose can be carried out by the mathematical sum of many
parts. There is no guarantee that goodness and reality are in
harmony though McTaggart says that practice and experience seem
1 Religious Values
. p. 56.
2 Moral Values and the Idea of God , cf
. ,
Brightman,
Religious Values
.
p. 63f
.
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to point in that direction. Nevertheless any moral relations
which exist must be the result of the character of the individ-
ual members of the 'community 1 . Such relations are admitted
but we still feel the need of some explanation. McTaggart
finds that the facts of cognition do not account for them. Per-
fect volition leads to activity in accord with reason, but even
this is not sufficient. There may be direct conflict between
knowledge and will. The synthesis, he finds in the motion of
love which is the perfect balance of cognition and volition.
Love is an attitude toward persons, and this fundamental love
offers the key to the problems of social relations. Of course
this is not the love of an impersonal Absolute nor of an equal-
ly impersonal humanity, but love of human persons, a dynamic
bond which unites all into a community of love.^
The philosophy of McTaggart has certain very definite
values. The universe is seen as a society of persons. The de-
mands of finite selfhood for distinction and unique value are
recognized. The view of an Absolute consciousness which is made
up of other finite consciousnesses is successfully refuted. The
binding character of moral obligation, regardless of the nature
of the universe, is true to the facts of moral experience.
In spite of these values certain difficulties exist
which make the system as a whole unsatisfactory. Tbese center
around the atheistic conclusion. If there is no Supreme Mind
how is the natural order to be explained? We have found that
it can be understood only as the experience of one Mind. And
the question of the existence of the xneny persons is equally
1 Studies in Hegelian Cosmology
.
Ch. IX.
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difficult. To explain the universe as merely an aggregate leadq,
as Bc-wne says, back to "the impossible pluralism of uncritical
speculation."! Unity is essentially a demand of the reason and,
as Bowne further says, "only creation can reconcile the reality
of the finite in this sense with the unity of the infinite". 2
Without God teleology is doubtful and certainly limited; the
logical implications of ethics are unrecognized; immortality
is bereft of its chief values and religion is godless. No
system of atheism can meet the demands of experience.
The pluralism of McTaggart destroys the real unity of
the universe by its denial of a Supreme Person. We need a sys-
tem which will include the facts of finite selfhood and yet ac-
count for unity. The system of Howison professes to do this.
2. Ethical Individualism.
In common with most pluralistic idealism Howison' s sys-
tem starts with personal experience or knowledge of the self and
of other selves. No amount of doubting can disprove my own ex-
istence for I know it with immediate certainty. The solution
already sketched leads to knowledge of other selves whose exper-
ience is equally real. These many minds and their experiences
are ultimately real or noumenal. Part of their experience is of
the physical world and this must be interpreted. Things, for
Howison, are thoroughly ideal. As discovered through sense-
experience they are phenomenal and the creation of the exper-
iencing minds. Reason, however, points to a noumenal existence.
^ Met aphysics
. p. 96.
Ibid
. t p. 97.
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It cannot "be content with mere appearances but must posit an ob-
jective order behind the phenomena. Evolution, for Howison,
reigns only in the realm of the phenomenal. It does not reach
over into the realm of persons except as they are affected by
the activities of phenomena in the process of development. Mind
as noumenal, is not evolving. It is eternal and has no origin
in time, but merely the logical one of reference to other selves
and to God. Minds are members of an 'Eternal Republic' but,
"in the literal sense of the word, they have no origin at all--
no source in time whatever. There is nothing at all, prior to
them, out of which their being arises; they are not things, in
the chain of efficient causation. They simply are , and together
constitute the eternal order," 1
But who or what is God? Howison seems to follow the
suggestion of Lotze in the closing pages of his Metaphysics that
the beginning of all metaphysics is to be found in ethics. It
is from the standpoint of ethical individualism that Howison ap-
proaches the solution of ultimate problems. Finite selves have
been shown by immediate experience to be genuine existences.
Having established the world of minds he must prove the exis-
tence of the Supreme Mind which is the Ideal or pattern for all
lesser minds. His argument is the following: 2 The finite self-
definer can define himself primarily only in distinction from
the Ideal, end the Supreme Mind must find its complement in
finite minds. Either both are real or neither has any reality.
Instead of arguing from perfection to existence as Descartes
did, Howison' s argument is: "The idea of every self and the
1 Howison, Limits of Evoluti on , p. xiv,
2 Ibid
, , p, 355
.
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idea of God are inseparably connected, so that if any self ex-
ists, then God also must exist; but any ami every self demon-
strably exists, for (as apud Cart esiuin ) the very doubt of its
existence implies its existence; and therefore God really exists."
> Howison ignores the fact that we shall later find in the philo-
sophy of Lotze that persons have true being for self as well as
being in distinct i on* from others.
The fundamental relation of God to other selves in How-
ison' s system is ethical. He is not supreme as an Absolute, but
rather one of the many and at times it seems as if he had less
power than they. He is finite and impotent in the affairs of
mankind just because of his ethical nature which seems to exhaust
itself in recognizing and respecting the freedom of the many. The
many are uncreated, so do not owe their existence to God, He is
not a creative force in the world, an efficient cause, but a
final cause in the sense of being the partially abstract Ideal
by which human lives are tested, and patterned.
But why posit such a God? Why not choose either the
atheism of McTaggart or the Absolute of certain idealists? How-
ison* s chief reason seems to be the necessity of providing for
freedom. Like Bosanquet he holds that every created being is
completely dependent upon his creator. If this be true, he
cannot possibly be free "for no being that arises out of effi-
cient causation can possibly be free", 2 He seems to be basing
this interpretation of creation on the Leibnizian theory of pre-
established harmony. Such a view would lead t-o a mechanistic
interpretation of freedom, yet he rightly rejects such a view as
incompatible with morality.
1 Ibid , , p. 359.
Ibid., p. 332,
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The problem of freedom is not yet solved for how can
the individual exercise his free will without coming into con-
flict with that of his neighbor? The result of such a system
would he ultimate chaos. The solution offered by Howison is
f that of reason acting in a reasonable world. He finds the rela-
tive determinism which rationality demands perfectly compatible
with rational freedom. The argument is that all free individuals
possess a rational nature and, therefore, their acts, though not
predictable in individual cases, are all in accord with reason
and result in harmony and order which seem very like determinism.
An optimistic view this certainly is. It is based on the supposi-
tion that all minds will act according to the rationality which
they possess. This is not always the case and evil results
.
Sin is the result of the dual nature of man, the earth-
ly or physical part of him forever warring with the truly ration-
al and God-like. There is no danger of confusing the Supreme
Self with any of the Many for they are set off from his perfection
by their fraility and tendencies to err. "This union of two an-
tagonistic natures in one individual whole is absolutely foreign
to God, the eternal Sum of all Perfections. It belongs, on the
contrary, to that non-divine order of existence, and it there-
fore forms an inerasible distinction between the one member of
the world of Spirits who realises its Ideal eternally , and all
the other possible members."
1
The goal of activity and freedom is not clearly stated
but is implied. It is the development of persons to complete
rationality and this, for Howison, is perfect morality. The
1 iPid. * * P. 364.
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Complete Reason is Conscience and w in this complete reason, or
Conscience, the single spirit sees itself as indeed a per sen
a self-active member of a manifold syst em of persons, all alike
self-active in the inclusive unit of their being; all indepen-
dent centres of origination , so far as effi ci ent causation is
concerned, all moving from 'within'," and harminizing their con-
duct as free members of the 'City of God', 1
Development of persons to such rationality is not pos-
sible in a limited time. Because of this and because of the very
nature of personality, Howison holds that persons are eternal.
Universal immortality is the only possible result of such a view
of personality. The question of the justice of this is not ful-
ly met. Immortality is, of course, a spiritual life, but it is
not to be thought of as "barren through the absence of sensory
experience. Rather is it the richer because of a fuller appre-
ciation of values. It is a serious question whether, for How-
ison, this future life is sinless because cut off from physical
nature which produced its former duality. Living in full ra-
tionality might there not be the possibility of breaking down
the distinctions between the many and the One?
The system of ethical individualism here sketched
leaves certain very definite gaps. The view of persons as eter-
nal raises the question of preexistence. If consciousness is
what we hold it to be there would be some memory of such a life
yet we have no such memory. Is it not possible that there
might be both creation and freedom? Such a view would make con-
scious life more coherent and, at the same time, add greatly to
the character of God.
1 "City of God"
, in Royce, Concept ion of God , p. 91f
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The account of the physical world is inadequate.
Things merely as the experience of finite minds governed by
laws made by these same minds would tend toward the chaotic.
What proof is there that my experience will coincide with the
experience of any other person, if we are making these laws
each for himself? And do the objects of my experience disap-
pear when I am not experiencing them? Berkeley* s criticism and
argument for God as constant experiencer of the physical world
is valid. Howison may accept this but he does not make it evi-
dent or use it as a proof of the existence of God.
Howison 1 s emphasis on ethics is good but does not go
far enough. He seems to find in freedom and the mutual respect
of its rights, the v/hole story of the moral life. It remains
to be seen whether there is not a higher morality to be found
in a purposive universe controlled by a God who is responsible
for the ultimate outcome of all life. Final causality does not
answer this demand completely. Moral values are only a part of
the life of value, a significant part, but not the whole.
The greatest addition that Howison makes to the plu-
ralism of McTaggart is in his view of God, not as the Absolute
or as on t;he level of the liany, but as a Supreme Person, This
adds content to ethical values, and also to the conception of
purpose. The emphasis on the value of individuals as individu-
als is also better than the insignificance of the one when tak-
en apart from the many as McTaggart would hold. We look, how-
ever, for a view which will account for the finite and the in-
finite even more coherently.
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3. Theistic Pluralism.
The third type of pluralistic idealism remains. We
have identified it as ethical theism. It is theistic in that
God is regarded as the Supreme Person, transcending the world,
yet immanent in it; it is ethical in that purpose is the funda-
mental category, and in that that purpose involves the moral ob-
ligation of every individual to realize values. God, who has
created free "beings, becomes the most completely obligated of
all. As Bowne has said: M It was an awful responsibility that
was taken when our human race was launched with its fearful pos-
sibilities of good and evil. God thereby put himself under in-
finite obligation to care for his human family; and reflections
on his position as Creator and Ruler instead of removing, only
make this obligation more manifest," 1
Hermann Lotze is the real founder of this system in its
recent forms. He turned away from the monistic philosophy of
Hegel and toward the monadology of Leibniz, to whom he owes much>
He opposed any dualistic interpretation of the world and found
that the only rational explanation of the experience of interac-
tion between things and spirits must lie in a view of both as
ultimately the product of spirit. In common with monism, he
held the world ground to be an Absolute. The Absolute was, for
him, personal and possessed of all the attributes of perfect
personality. God is one God. In him there is perfect unity.
He is unchangeable, not because of inactivity, but rather as
the result of perfect self-identity and consistency. He is im-
manent in the world and omnipotent over it. Eternity and
1 Studies in Christianity , p. 95.
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transcendence of space and time limitations also characterize
him.
It is not so much the attributes of God as the impli-
cations of these for the universe that interest us at present.
In opposition to McTaggart and Howison and in common v/ith all
members of this group of pluralistic idealists, Lotze accepted
the doctrine of creativity. The world is the result of the
creative will of the Absolute, but it is not a creation which
took place sometime in the past, once and for all. Rather is
it a constant, moment by moment, process of creation by an im-
manent Will. The preservation of the world is, for him, "a
continual new-creation" .1 The question might be raised as to
the danger of sudden and unpredictable changes in the world as
the result of this moment by moment creation. This difficulty
Lotze meets with the assurance of the very character of perfect
personality. It could not be other than coherent, abiding by
its own rational laws,- Nature itself is not self-sufficient or
indestructible but appears so because of the divine creativity
which is constant, "The entire interior consistency of the co-
hering order of nature, upon which the natural sciences are sup
ported, is conceded as a matter of fact; but taken as a whole
and at large it is regarded as a system of mutually conditionin
actualities, utterly dependent upon the divine power; so that
ultimately, therefore, the World does not preserve itself but
is preserved by God,"2 He is opposed to the mechanical inter-
pretation of nature and finds the final purpose of a rational
Being the truer explanation of the facts, 3
1 Outlines of Philosophy of Religion
, p, 92,
Ibid
. , p. 94.
3 Outlines of Metaphysics
t p. H5ff.
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This world, created by God, is made up of physical
things and personal spirits, but his relation to these two or-
ders is somewhat different. Things are entirely "modifications
of his being"-1- but finite persons have a relative existence for
themselves. "Personality", argues Lotze, "does not depend on
the distinction of a me from a not me
;
it has its basis in pure
selfhood--in being for-or-t o-self ; the personality of God there-
fore, does not necessarily involve the distinction by God of
himself from what is not himself, and so his limitation or fi-
niteness; on the contrary 'perfect personality is to be found
only in God, while in all finite spirits there exists only a
weak imitation of personality; the finiteness of the finite is
not a productive condition of personality, but rather a hinder-
o
ing barrier to its perfect development.' " ° In this view of per-
sonality Lotze opposes Howison who states that neither Absolute
nor finite self can define itself except in opposition to the
other.
Finite selves are developing beings and achieve self-
hood through experience, For this development a knowledge of
other things outside themselves is necessary. Here Lotze be-
comes a critic of Leibniz and shows the inadequacy of monads
without windows. It is only through their relation to the Ab-
solute that this need can be met. The Absolute has the ability
to make such experience possible and finite persons recognize
this power "which works through and through them, and, without
their own assistance, prescribes for them the universal forms
1 Outlines of Philosophy of Religion , p. 66.
Uberweg, History of Philosophy, vol, II. p , 320.
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of their spiritual activity, their sensation, imagination, judg-
ment, etc.; and which permits them only within narrow limits to
dispose further of this dowry, and to pursue their special ends.
That is to say, therefore: 'Personality* is in them only very
imperfectly accompli shed." 1
Like Howison, Lotze lays stress upon the ethical
though he does not develop it so fully. He, however, finds no
inherent inconsistency between freedom and individual creation.
Mere 'being for self is not a sufficient attribute of indepen-
dent beings. They must also be creators in whom there is pos-
sibility of changing God's plan. Only so can there be real mor-
ality and the problem of evil is largely explained by this fact.
The concept of value is here fundamental. Only a teleological
ethics which expresses the aim of God as being the development
of true character through self-di recti on can give satisfaction.
The divine government is one of justice and opportunity.
In the philosophy of Lotze we have a real synthesis be-
tween the many and the One, He conceives of the One as a person
and yet not in such a way as to destroy the reality of the many,
and he finds in the finite the key to perfect personality rather
than a limitation that would make a Supreme Person impossible.
Following Lotze come three thinkers who are close stu-
dents of his thought and who interpret and carry out its impli-
cations. These men are George Trumbull Ladd, James Ward and
Borden Parker Bov/ne. Ward and Bowne studied under Lotze and
Ladd is the translator of the series of Outlines taken from the
1 Outlines of Philosophy of Religion, p. 67f,
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lecture courses of Lotze and summarizing his mature thought on
the various branches of philosophy.
In general the agreement "between Ladd and Lotze is
close. The universe, for Ladd, is discoverable through the ra-
tional activity of each individual mind. It is found to consist
of persons and things. The problem of their relation arises and
the only solution which makes them thinkable is that of an Abso-
lute Person. Ladd, like Lotze, tends toward absolutism in this
discussion and does not do full justice to the arguments for
plurality in the uni -verse, though he recognizes it as a fact.
The Absolute is the source of all being and immanent in the whole
process of life, yet freedom of finite individuals is an undeni-
able fact. This is explained by the difference between knowing
and willing. God may know all about my actions but my will is
my own and he is not responsible for what I do with it.
Ladd agrees with Lotze in his philosophy of nature,
attributing to things the same characteristics as to selves.
He seems to remain in doubt as to how far down the ecale of re-
ality selfhood extends. The unity among things is attributed
to the World Ground. "Viewed in its ontological aspect, H he
says, "all growth of man's scientific discoveries reveals the
Being of the World— as a unity of Force, that is constantly
distributing itself amongst the different beings of the world
so as to bestow upon them a temporary quasi -independence » while
always keeping them in dependent inter-relations, for the reali-
zation of its own immanent ideas. But this is to make Nature
pre-eminently Self-like; it is the Nature which serves as the
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Ground of all the world's self -like things.
The World Ground is Absolute Person, or, as he else-
where says, Personal Will, This Absolute Person is God, the
moral ruler of the universe as well as its sustaining cause.
God is the same power or force that works through nature and
also thfough the moral will of the individual. He is self-
limited by his own character but by nothing outside himself.
Ward is in even closer harmony with Lotze, in part due
to the similarity of their academic preparation. Both began
with a study of physiology and the interest in this branch of
knowledge is prominent. Both emphasize the close connection
between science and philosophy and both develop the empirical
method. Ward has sometimes been called the English Lotze.
Ward sketches in his preface to the Realm of Ends the
basie elements of the position he defends. "This world immedi-
ately confronts us not as one Mind, nor even as the manifesta-
tion of one, but as an objective whole in which we discern many
minds in mutual interaction. It is from this pluralistic stand-
point that our experience has in fact developed, and it is here
that we acquire the ideas that eventually lead beyond it. For
pluralism, though empirically warrented, we find defective and
unsatisfactory: but the theism to which it points is only an ide-
al--an ideal however that, as both theoretically and practically
rational, may claim our faith though it transcend our knowledge."
Ward begins with the experience of individual selves
and finds that the distinction in their consciousness between
subject and object leads inevitably to pluralism. Not only are
1 Ladd, Knowledge , Life and Reality
, p. 223.
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there many things and selves beyond the one subject, but he re-
cognizes within himself a multiplicity of lesser selves which
are in mutual int ere ominuni cation. Such facts of eonsciousness
as dissociation and the subconscious are explained by these les-
ser selves. In taking the step from the many to the One, Ward
finds the view of the Absolute inadequate. The Absolute is a to
tality but not a true unity, "There might have been an Absolute
provided there had been no Many, but holding to the reality of
these we can regard God as supreme, but not as absolute: then we
seem to save the Many but we have only a 'finite God 1 or rather
the idea of one," 1 Without an Absolute the problem of account-
ing for the meaning and unity of the universe seems almost hope-
less; with the Absolute plurality is endangered.
Pluralism begins v/ith the many, as ward repeatedly re-
minds us, and ends v/ith the many, but the question is whether
this is the true beginning and end or whether there may not be
both lower and higher limits; a fundamental ground and an ulti-
mate end. Such a ground we may find in God, the creator of the
many and of the natural world in which they live. In him also
we find the moral ends tov/ard which the many move.
Such a view does not deny evolution though it is con-
trary to certain theories of evolutionary development. The pro-
cess is one of creative synthesis in which new factors are con-
stantly entering, not a preformi sm in which nothing can be evol-
ved which was not first involved. Natural selection may, and
does, account for many factors in the development of the species
but it is not sufficient to account for all. The mind of man is
1 Realm
, of Ends
, p. 43.
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not explained by it. Even as man changes the course of develop-
ment in plants and animals by the use of intellect, so the exis-
tence of man as a new being, tjuite different from the brute life
that preceded him, is not to be considered merely the result of
natural selection but rather is "to be attributed to a similar
interference of some superior or supreme int elligence." 1
Creation is incompatible with freedom only when it is
considered as a process taking place in the dim past when by
fiat all that ever is to be was determined. If creation is a
continuous process and the creatures are also creators there is
no good reason for denying the possibility of freedom. For Ward
freedom is an established psychological fact. It is not a limi-
tation upon God for it is the realization of his ethical nature
which includes the respect for the realm of ends because it is
his end.
Theism and pluralism end at the same point: God is love.
Ward beautifully sums up this thought in his closing paragraph.
"The world is God's self-limitation, self-renunciation might we
venture to say? And so God is love. And what must that world be
that is worthy of such love? The only worthy object of love is
just love: it must then be a world that can love God. But love
is free: in a ready-made world then it could have no place. Only
as we learn to know God do we learn to love him: hence the long
and painful discipline of evolution, trith its dying to live--the
converse process to incarnation—the putting off the earthly for
the likeness of God. In such a realm of ends we trust "that God
p
is love indeed, and love creation's final law, 1 "*
1 Ibid * » P« 91-
2 Ibid
. , p. 453.
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Bov/ne, the third of the present group to be considered,
popularized the Lotzean ideas in an original manner and applied
to the system the name * personalism' • The significance of this
system is being felt more and more widely as his students carry
out and build upon his thought. He was a student of Lotze and
was greatly influenced by him but turned more definitely to plu-
ralism. His thought is also very similar to that of Ward, but
Bowne lays more stress on the unity of the World Ground and the
immanence of God in nature.
In his Thei sm Bovme states that there are three possi-
ble approaches to knowledge of reality."
1
" One may start by doubt-
ing everything that can be doubted. This method has often been
adopted by philosophy but it leads only to barren speculation.
One may, on the other hand, believe everything that has not been
proved false. This method leads to many fruitful conclusions but
there still remain facts for which there is no proof or disproof.
Many of the most significant facts of experience belong in this
class and Bovme asserts that these may be accepted as postulates
of the practical reason until such time as proof or disproof
arrive. Like Kant, he recognizes the limitation of pure reason
in accounting for all the facts of experience.
In considering our experience the first question is how
we can knov; the universe and what our observation tells us about
it. This is the problem of objective cognition. Bowne makes
this include the problems of interaction, law and system. 2 In-
teraction is a regular process and implies the second factor
1
p. llff.
2 Theism
, p. 47ff
.
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which is law. The laws are constant and the interaction is uni-
form. They seem to work together in a system, "The specific
nature of the laws and the system is, indeed, a problem for so-
lution; but the existence of rational law and system is implicit-
ly assumed, "^ The starting point of thought "is the conception
of things interacting according to law, and forming an intelli-
gible system." Intelligence is basic. As Bowne elsewhere says;
"If we seek a tenable theory of knowledge we find it only as we
reach a basal intelligence. If we seek to bind the many together
in an all-embracing system, it is possible only in and through
intelligence. If we seek for unity in being itself we find it
only in intelligence. If we seek for causality and identity in
being we find it only in intelligence. If we would give any ac-
count of the intelligible order and purpose-like products of the
world, again intelligence is the only key," 2 Intelligence is
not to be thought of as impersonal. All intelligence is owned
3by some person, and the intelligence that explains the uni-
verse is the intelligence of a Supreme Person, "Theism is the
fundamental postulate of our total life."^
Bowne argues the case convincingly against naturalism
and pantheism. He shows that any view of the universe as simply
a blind system of necessity is irrational. We find system and
order and rationality in the world and yet naturalism assumes
that these are causedby irrational power and purposeless neces-
sity. Pantheistic views are no better for, as we have already
seen, they do not account for the facts of error and ignorance,
1 Ibid.
. p. 49.
2 Metaphysics
. p. 111.
^
Personalism, p. 253ff
,
Theism
, p, iv.
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and for the characteristics of finite personality.
McTaggart argued that atheism was consistent with a
high type of morality, Bowne shows that atheism leads to moral
skepticism. True, it is my duty to do what I think I ought to
do, hut how do I know that it is more than my opinion unless I
"believe there is a supreme, moral law and purpose. But these
can exist only in a person. Mere conscientiousness is the only
aim for the atheist. Yet "a worthy moral aim can he found only
in the thought of a kingdom of righteousness and blessedness
realized in a community of moral persons. But no one can work
with this aim without implicitly assuming a higher power, which
is the guarantee of the possibility of its realization." 1
Creation for Bowne fulfills rather than destroys free-
dom. Creation is, for him, not making out of pre-exi stent ma-
terial but causative creation in which something entirely new
and separate comes into existence. The unity of the universe
is to be interpreted as one of purpose rather than of indivisi-
bility. It is the purpose of God to create something other
than himself.
4. Pluralistic Solutions.
The philosophy of pluralistic idealism or personalism
is being developed by many thinkers in the present day. It is
now our purpose to summarize the solutions which this philoso-
phy offers to the problems which have been raised. 2
1 Theism
, p. 251.
2 In summarizing the position of present day pluralistic
idealism the writer is influenced by the thought of
Dr. Edgar S. Brightman, of Boston University.
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The first problem is that of the world of nature. The
results of the sciences and of philosophy point to the same con-
clusion as to physical tnings. Science, in opposition to naive
realism, finds things to be made up of active particles exhioit-
ing force or energy as their fundamental .uality. Philosophy
finds that "the system of tnings is active like a mind; changes,
like a mind; is coherent and rational like a mind; and within
limits, mind can use it.""*" Berkeley and Lotze suggest what Bowne
and Brightman carry out, the view that physical things are the
active experience of just one mind, the mind of God. The ad-
vantage of this view lies in the fact that it meets the diffi-
culties left by other theories and makes the world 01 nature in-
telligible. The problem of dualism is avoided by showing the
ideal nature of things. The monadological view oi nature is
still accepted by some, and, strange to say, some monists hold
this pluralistic view of nature.^ This theory states that na-
ture is possessed of mind though of a much lower order than that
of animals or man. There are inherent difficulties in this view.
If nature is all mind, does every atom have a separate soul, or
only larger groups of atoms? How does it happen that the whole
world of nature works together so perfectly if it really is made
ui of so many individuals? The fundamental objection is that
there is very little value in adopting such a conclusion on the
facts we now possess. It may be true but it is a fruitless hypo-
thesis. The view of all of nature as the experience of one mind
is simpler and more coherent. It may well be accepted till fur-
ther facts appear since it adds to the understanding of experience,
1 Brightman, Intro duct ion to Philosophy, p. 122,
2 Calkins, Persistent ProbTems~^"f Philosophy, p. 429ff.
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Quite evidently things are nothing for themselves but
only real as they become part of the experience of some self.
Our next problem will then be to establish the meaning of this
term 'selfhood'. A self is a conscious unity of self-experience,
"a synthesizer of unity and multiplicity.*! A self is not a bro-
ken fragment but a whole, hov/ever low in the scale of selves it
may be. Yet it is not a simple whole made up of feu experiences.
Rather does it draw within the unity of an organizing reason the
greatest multiplicity of experiences.
All pluralistic idealists hold that there are many fi-
nite selves. This conclusion is the direct consequence of their
acceptance of immediate experience and the empirical method.
There is difference of opinion as to the origin of
these many selves and their relation to the universe as a whole.
McTaggart, for instance, denies the existence of a Supreme Per-
son and finds the many t o be so completely interdependent that
every part is necessary for the whole and completely determined
by it; but the whole is no more than the sum of its parts, it
has no being for itself but is merely a social organism. Howi-
eon postulates a God as the final cause of the universe but de-
nies him any constant creative activity or efficient causation.
Finite selves are co-eternal with God and find in him the per-
fect ethical ideal but not the dynamic source of their existence.
For the pluralistic followers of Lotze the conclusion
is quite otherwise. The Supreme Person is the source and ground
of the universe. We have found in hirn the necessary explanation
of things. In him also is the solution of the problem of finite
1 Brightman, I ntroduction to Philosophy
, p. 192.
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selfhood. The many finite selves, though relatively indepen-
dent, are created and maintained by the Supreme Self. Modern
thought here follows Lotze closely in its view of creation as
the constant activity of the Immanent Will. Not a far-off God,
but a Force, as Ladd would say, working perpetually as the sus-
taining power beneath existence.
The fects of human experience draw us away from con-
clusions which might seem to point toward absolutism. The dif-
ficulties of that system have already been recognized. Separ-
ateness and privacy are as real facts of finite experience as
dependence and limitation. My consciousness is my own and a
part of no other person's experience except as I choose to re-
veal it. Error and ignorance are accounted for without attrib-
uting them to God. If I have an existence for myself, and if
this existence is limited by the imperfection of my instruments
of communication and understanding, I may make mistakes, and I
shall certainly never grasp the truth about all reality. If,
on the other hand, I were part of the Absolute consciousness
it is difficult to see why I should be ignorant of anything
that goes on it it. It is of the nature of mind to be a whole,
and for each part to know the whole. Experience proves that
we do not know the whole of the Absolute Mind and it is unrea-
sonable to hold that we are part of it. Theistic idealism, as
Brightman has said, "interprets reality as a society of persons
there is one Supreme Person, in and for whose thought and will
all physical things exist so that they are nothing apart from
him. The functioning of his conscious will is their being;
their matter and energy is his conscious purpose concretely
tt««MV»MU Ail .1
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expressed. Finite persons also depend on his purpose for their
being, yet their being is self-conscious and relatively self-
determining; not identical with his consciousness, as is the be
ing of physical tnings. In finite selves, the Supreme Person
wills the existnece of what is genuinely other than himself; so
that the universe is ultimately a society of selves, not a sin-
gle self. For absolutism, God is all that there is; for per-
sonalism, God is not all there is, --human persons are no part
of him." 1
Pluralism gives meaning and value to the individual.
Freedom is possible for beings that have a relative indepen-
dence of their creator. With freedom comes the possibility
of moral choice, and the problem of moral evil. Absolutism
solves the problem by denying that evil is really evil, yet
the problem remains. Some have solved the problem by saying
that God is finite and impotent to prevent the evil which men
will. Such a view is better than one which holds that he wills
all the evil in the world. It gives hazard and adventure,
scope to the moral question, worth to the individuals as co-
partners with God in the struggle for the best; but is this
enough?
Instead of saying that God is finite may we not say
that he is limited, both by the laws of reason and by his fun-
damental purpose. It is of the nature of personality to be
able to impose laws upon itself. God, by his very character,
must be loyal to the laws which he thus imposes. They must
be perpetual and unvarying. His whole life and the life of
every person in his universe must be directed by some purpose

if we are to find meaning in life. God's purpose in the uni-
verse, interpreted in the highest terms we ca.n conceive, must
he " soul-making" • It is not in harmony with any lofty ideals
to create a race of puppets without wills, "robots" who act
mechanically hut blindly. But the creation of moral beings
with the power to choose good and evil, to cooperate with God
in the realization of cosmic ends or to defy hiiL even to the
point of cosmic destruction is a purpose so challenging, so
courageous as to grip our vision and inspire reverence. The
moral adventure demands freedom for only the man to whom
choice is possible is moral. When free beings are created
this is an essential limitation of the power of God but a lim-
itation which is self-imposed. We have, not a God in whom all
things are perfected, but rather one who needs our help in the
perfecting of his universe. He does not will evil but he does
leave us free to choose. Evil in the universe exists because
he is loyal to the principles and purposes of his nature and
will not interfere with man's choices. If they choose badly
they must suffer the consequences and he too must suffer with
them in their defeat which is also his own. "Fersonalism
makes purpose the fundamental category of personality, human
or divine. The purpose of God as revealed in experience is not
that the universe shall be eternally and simultaneously perfect
but rather that persons shall have an opportunity to grow. Not
static completeness, but development; not a block-universe, but
a universe of suffering and growing love this is the picture
that theism presents. The possibility of achievement is as
contingent on effort in a personali stic world as it is in a
4 I
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world of neutral entities, the possibility of failure is as
real; on the other hand, the incentive for achievement is great
er, the tragedy of failure more poignant."*1" This is no com-
fortable universe for the cowardly, but it certainly is one
which will develop those traits of character which are univer-
sally recognized as most ideal.
A word still needs to be said about natural evil. Why
is it that man must suffer from disease and earthquakes and
floods? Either God is evil or there must be some necessity
v/hich binds him. The latter seems most probable. God is a ra-
tional being and he has created a world which is ordered by ra-
tional principles. God, by his very character, must be loyal
to the laws which he thus imposes. They must be perpetual and
without shadow of turning. if they are to work for final good.
Natural laws cannot be broken for individuals, but individuals
are given minds in order that they may learn these laws and
use them rather than be destroyed by them.
An impersonal view of reality fails to account for
our experiences as persons; a mechanistic interpretation of the
process of life denies the facts of purpose which are essential
to all thinking; a view of the world as ultimately one being
denies the facts of individual experiences of privacy and free-
dom. The view of pluralistic idealism, holding that there is
one Supreme Person, the creator of the many finite persons who
are of true value as members of a Kingdom of Ends, the Cosmic
Purposer whose character guarantees the ultimate realization of
values; this view offers the most reasonable solution to the
problems which confront us.
1 Ibid
. . p. 334f.
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III. THE IMPLICATIONS OP PLURALISTIC IDEALISE
FOR THE AIMS OF- RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.
In stating at the outset the aims of religious edu-
cation it was necessary to define the religion in terms of
which we were to educate. He defined it as "that type of per-
sonal life characterized by faith in and the feeling of de-
pendence on God, and dominated "by the will to cooperate with
him in the conservation and increase of values." 1 The chief
factors in this definition are persons and values. God is
recognized as the source of power and as worthy of trust;
and his supreme aim is seen to be the conservation and in-
crease of values. The religion of the many persons is a
living faith; willing and significant cooperation, and cre-
ative activity.
A. A Philosophical Evaluation of Religion.
The problem which now confronts us is what philosophy
has to say about this credo of religion? He shall consider
first the meaning of personality for religion.
1. Persons and Religion.
Naturalism or materialism is that type of philosophy
which holds that matter is all that there is and that its laws
explain everything that it is necessary to know about the uni-
verse and ourselves. The laws of naturalism are completely
mechanistic; the only persons possible are biological organisms;
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their experience is limited to sense perceptions of a material
world and nothing can he known which is beyond it. What impli-
cations has such a view for religion?
In the first place there could he no God unless we
could find some cosmic biological organism which could be ex-
perienced through the senses. There admittedly is no such be-
ing and the naturalist substitutes Humanity as the object of
his worship. Finite persons as biological organisms are lit-
tle more real than God. Consciousness is only the way in
which the body acts, and is no more when the body dies. Per-
sons can know things and other persons as perceived in the ex-
ternal world but they can know nothing of ideals and values.
Not only is freedom impossible in a mechanistic universe, but
so also is all thought. Everything is caused by what preceded
it with absolute necessity and the motions of matter which are
called thought are as thoroughly determined as the similar mo-
tions that are called conduct. There can be no purpose, not
even the purpose to think and to know the truth. ^ If this be
the truth, the religion of our definition is destroyed for it
is based on personal relations to a personal God. Faith, feel-
ing and will are aspects of personal consciousness; and how
can there be cooperation between completely determined beings
and a non-existent God?
Our study of the philosophy of naturalism led to the
conclusion that it is based on a partial view of the world and
that the facts of mind are entirely ignored. We discovered
that mind rather than matter was ultimate and that things had
existence only for minds as parts of their experience. We also
1 C_f . Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy , Ch. VIII
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found that mechanistic laws were interpreted and used by minds
which were t eleological
»
Our consideration of personality as ultimate led us to
another possible view, that of absolute idealism which holds
that the universe is just one Supreme Being or Absolute and
everything else is part of him. Such a view is much richer in
possibilities for religion. Personality, which is essential
to religion, is also the inner nature of the universe. God as
a personal being is possible, though not all absolutism accepts
such an interpretation of the Absolute. The many persons are
also admitted as parts of God and as expressing his purpose.
The fact of their dependence is most evident. Religion is per-
fectly possible under such a view but not the religion of our
definition and for the following reasons:
Absolutism, in common with naturalism destroys the
possibility of freedom and so of cooperation for parts of an
Absolute consciousness must be completely dependent on the
will of the Absolute. He may see values in persons and will
to increase and conserve them but obviously the many partial
selves can have no will of their own.
Absolutism is also contrary to our understanding of
personality for no person can be part of another, even of the
Absolute. Consciousness is essentially private and unique.
Worship of the Absolute would be partial self-worship
.
Another serious objection to the pantheistic religion
of absolutism is that it makes God responsible for all the
evil in the world. A God who wills evil cannot be the perfect
source of values and the moral ideal.
Ir
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We finally turned to pluralistic idealism for a truer
explanation of the facts of experience in general. It also
gives a more satisfactory interpretation of religious exper-
ience. For pluralistic idealism personality is ultimate, even
as for absolutism, but we have a new interpretation of the re-
lation between God and man. God does not include within him-
self finite selves, though he is the author of their being and
its conserving force. In them he has permitted, nay willed,
the existence of something truly other than himself. This
view of reality and the view of religion which we have posited
seem to be in close harmony. Religion is the free devotion of
persons to a Personal God on whom they feel dependent for most,
but not all, the facts of their experience, and in whom they
have faith. They are free to choose his will or their own but
the religious attitude is voluntary cooperation with him in a
life of true worth.
The advantages of this as a philosophy of religion
lie in the facts that God is immanent in his world and yet not
determining every action; that he is a moral being, realizing
definite purposes through his relation with men but not re-
sponsible for their evil and ignorant actions; and that he is
a true individual, separate from all other individuals, yet
capable of entering into the most intimate relations of com-
munion and fellowship, and supremely worthy of the humble
worship that can be given only to a just and holy Person by
a free and loving child. The values of man and of God are
recognized without destroying the unity of the whole.

2. Values and Religion.
The second factor in our definition is the conserva-
tion of values. For naturalism the matter of values must ob-
viously be omitted for it can consider only those facts which
are presented to the senses. All values are supersensuous
,
and yet they can exist only in the experience of some person.
Absolutism provides the possibility for value experience in
the whole and in the parts. It recognizes the worth of indi-
viduals as members of the whole and gives a meaning to the
universe as the home of values. There are, however, limita-
tions in this view of values and particularly of moral values.
Considering the facts of experience which point to the de-
struction of many values how can v/e point to the Absolute as
the cause of all and yet as perfect goodness? Evil is an un-
pleasant but undeniable fact of experience, and it seems to
destroy much of the value of life is absolutism is accepted.
Thus even the problem of the conservation of values
points to pluralistic idealism as the most adeouate solution.
For it every person is of unique value and capable of rich
value experiences. Yet finite persons recognize that their
values are only fragmentary and incomplete. They never fully
attain unto the ideal. Values are objective as well as sub-
jective. They are universally accepted by all reasonable mind^
and, as Sorley and Brightman show, they can be formed into a
coherent system. This system could not exist in any finite
mind and yet values are nothing apart from some mind. The con-
tradiction is solved when we interpret them as "the experiences
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of a mind beyond all human individuals and societies"! the mind
of God, Not only are values conserved by God and man, but they
are constantly increased by both. Part of the eternal purpose
of God is that men should grow through their own efforts to
those higher realms of value which are a part of his self-
revelation.
Values for naturalism are merely desired objects judg-
ed by no supernatural ideals. For absolutism values would
seem to be static if the logic of the position be carried out.
True, the parts may come to a fuller knowledge of the values
which already exist in the whole but it is hardly possible
that new values could be created by what is already perfect.
Pluralism finds the fundamental purpose of God to be the crea-
tion of new values and of new creators. Here infinite develop-
ment is not only possible but necessary and immortality is
just another stage of value-seeking,
B, Implications for Religious Education.
The results of pluralistic idealism which affect the
aims of religious education are two: Personality is the ulti-
mate reality in the universe; and, Values are conserved. V/e
have seen what these factors mean for religion; let us now
see v/hat changes they will make in religious education.
1, Personality is Ultimate.
First, then, let us consider the assertion that per-
sonality is ultimate. For religious education thie means two
1 Ibid
. , p. 163.
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things: that God is a personal being and supreme, and that all
the rest of reality is made up of persons, finite but like him.
If naturalism were t rue ^ religious education would be possible
but unreasonable. Much of current education is based on this
theory. It says that the child is a little animal, the result
of organic evolution and moulded by external forces. Education
consists in the presentation of the many facts of life to the
child so that he may learn useful reactions and habits which
will work for self-preservation and adjustment. Dr. Athearn
says that this kind of life is symbolized by the wheel which
rolls in the direction of least resistence. It is the life of
contentment and acceptance of what is. Religious education,
we have said, aims not at what is but at what ought to be; at
the ideal society which is possible rather than at the imper-
fect social conditions which now are.
Idealism v»rhich recognizes personality as ultimate may
be symbolized, he says, by the Cross which is the sign of
change in environment; struggle, suffering, victory. For the
idealist the person is lord over matter. In personality there
is creative power, self-direction, capacity to reorganize en-
vironment in the light of ideals. Religious education, to the
idealist, is the presentation of ideals to a personality which
has within it the power to imitate the ideal, to judge between
ideals, and to create new ideals as increased knowledge brings
new visions.
Another implication of the ultimacy of personality is
that, if the universe is entirely made up of persons, it is of
;P
t
t
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paramount importance what sort of persons they are. For natu-
ralism it would make very little difference what sort of train-
ing is given for persons are believed to be unable to change
their nature or environment. For absolutism there is opi ortu-
nity for vast growth in knowledge ,t i 11 the perfection of the
Absolute is encompassed. Knowledge, then, must be given by
religious education if the finite person is ever to know the
wonders of the whole. But even here we have not the moral
ideal which comes from the pluralistic view of freedom, choice
and cooperation. Children come into the world with plastic
natures and possibilities of either good or evil. Their bodies
will become the tools of their minds and will be moulded by
whatever ideal they choose. It is the duty and privilege of
the religious educator to present ideals and motives in such
a compelling way that they Will be chosen and followed. The
automaton without mind is incapable of acting beyond the hab-
its and reactions v/hich have been taught him. The child who
is a true person is capable of understanding ideals and apply-
ing them to new situations. Every normal person is able to
judge between ideals and many different ones ehould be at his
command. Ideals should not be tied to a single situation as
is necessary if behaviorism is the whole truth. Rather they
should be taught as general principles for minds have the ca-
pacity to understand the principles and to apply them to con-
crete situations. In the presentation of ideals to children
and young people the religious educator must remember that
they are growing personalities and the method of teaching must
be suited to the age. Ideals cannot be presented to children,
•
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and probably not to adults, merely as intellectual assertions.
As Dr. Athearn has said, no ideal is safe which is not shot
through with emotion and hacked up by will.
If the kind of universe is to be determined by the
people who make it up it is not safe to allow chance and nature
to determine the ideals they will choose. The universe can be
improved only as fast as individuals are taught to exercise
control in terms of ideal motives. The undisciplined life is
immoral and the result of our failure to teach the sterner
facts of life will be a chaotic universe of conflicting person-
ailties. Religious education must teach self-control and of-
fer ample opportunity for the practice of this virtue if its
aims are to be realized.
Finally we must consider the implications of the plu-
ralistic view of God for the aims of religious education. God
is held to be a Supreme Person, the ground and sustaining cause
of the entire universe. He is the creator of finite persons
and the co-worker with them in the creation of values. His
fundamental purpose is the cooperative attainment of values,
through the development of human beings. God is a spirit and
religious education must solve the problem of teaching the chiH
to know the Supreme Spirit if he is to avoid the suffering of
later years when reason will no longer permit him to hold what
Bowhe calls the "corporeal" view of God. In evaluating re-
ligious education Dr. Brightman says; "The only significant
results, in the end, are in the type of personal relation to
God that is developed. Does the child regard God as his
(
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Father, and his King, whom he loves and reveres, who has a
right to a cooperative interest in every activity of life? Does
the child see home and school, work and play as something in
which God has a part, and in which God and he are working to-
gether?" 1 Not only children hut all learners of religion need
this attitude toward God, Their relation to God should be one
of loving cooperation, obedience and reverence, even as God's
relation to them is cooperation, justice and respect. Relig-
ious education has tended to over- emphasize the loving-kind-
ness of God and to forget the justice that rolls down like a
mighly stream. Perfect love is compatible only with holy and
righteous character and religion mutet include this element or
it will train a generation of moral and spiritual weaklings,
2. Values are Conserved,
Again we turn to the matter of values, and learn that
they are conserved and that this conservation has meaning for
religious education.
The values of individuality are conserved by plural-
istic idealism. Every person is unique and has a significant
task to perform. Every individual is a home of values and a
creator of new values. Other views deny part or all the value
of personality. Absolutism finds the only value of finite per-
sons to be in their relation to the whole. They have no true
value in themselves. They are entirely subordinated to the
social values. Naturalism in practice does not deny all value
1 "The Personal Relation Between God and Children", Relig-
ious Education
. Feb., 1921, p. 28. *
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"but views it as a social and temporary matter. On naturalistic
principles there could "be no possibility of conservation of
personal values after death. Immortality is recognized, how-
ever, by pluralism as not only a possibility but a probability
because of the very nature of personality and its need of end-
less time for the realization of values. The religious educa-
tor who is interpreting life from the standpoint of pluralism
finds that every individual is of true value and his responsi-
bility is to even the least of these. He is training lives
that are to go on forever and he must consider what values are
worthy of endless development.
The values of morality are conserved by our view.
Naturalism and absolutism we have found, deny the i-ossibility
of morality by making freedom impossible. As we have shown,
freedom is essential to true education and to all moral con-
duct. The religious educator must build upon the moral char-
acter of God expressed in his relations to the world. Morality
also demands eternal development for our ideals are always be-
yond our attainment.
The values of reason an x coherence are conserved by
our view, religion, as we have seen, is the natural outcome of
pluralistic idealism. It is based on the most reasonable in-
terpretation of our experience taken ab a whole. Religious
education may aim at the well-rounded development of the in-
dividual without fear that it is aiming at the improvement of
the non-existent, or that it is based on fiction and fancy.
Finally, spiritual values are conserved by a view of
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the universe as personal. From the standpoint of religion
these are the most significant values of oil. God may he
found in many ways. He is revealed in the world of nature
with all its beauty, order and mystery. He is known through
other persons who have in them some of the likeness of the
perfect. He is known through thought and reason as one faces
the problems of experience. But he is known most perfectly
through ths.t mystic spiritual communion which we call worship.
Once more we turn to other views to see if they can meet our
needs. For naturalism the spiritual life is a myth; worship
and prayer arc to be explained as "motions of psychic atoms"
or as "sub-vocal mutterings" of the organism. There is no God;
there is no true personality; there can be no free worship of
an unseen Being. For absolutism worship is reverence by a
part of the whole in which it is included. In this view the
individual is lost, submerged in the whole. It is well repre-
sented by certain eastern religions where the mystic element
is so great that the aim is self-absorption into the Infinite.
This denies the values of individuality which we have just as-
serted .
But worship need not lead to annihilation. If our
philosophy be true it leads rather to self-development. In the
experience of worship the heart is opened to God and ready for
new understanding. God cannot reveal himself except to the re-
ceptive heart * and worship creates this receptivity v/hich is
the preliminary step. Worship, as Dr. Bfightman has shown6
creates new values within the individual; perspective, idealism
1 Brightman, Lectures.
2 Religious Values
.
Ch. IX.
(a
69
power; and also turns individuals into creators of new spiritual
values through the more perfect knowledge of God. Worship does
not deny the demands of life and experience but rather returns
the individual to his other life better able to meet its needs
and understand its complexities. It is not a divisive factor,
destroying social relations but a unifying bond which, as Rufus
Jones has said^ draws together the many factions in a common
experience of worship.
"Worship as a Unifying Force." Religious rducati
o
n,
Oct
.
, 1925.
<Q
SUMMARY*
The ultimate aim of religious education was said to
be Christian character expressed in right relations to God
and to one's fellowmen. This aim involves the development,
of every person to the point where he is capable of such fel-
lowship and such cooperation. We have examined the various
interpretations of experience and have reached the conclu-
sion that pluralistic idealism is the most coherent account
of the universe as a whole. We have considered the relations
of this system to our view of religion and have found that
it supports- a religious interpretation of the universe. We
have shown some implications v/hich this philosophy has for
the aims of religious education. Our conclusion ic that
religious education is justified in aiming at the all-around
development of every individual person, and in the training
of persons for eternal fellowship with a Personal God.
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